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Federal Securities Regulation
SECURITIES REGULATION - IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION - VIOLATION
OF INDENTURE PROVISION MANDATED BY THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT
OF 1939 (ACT) GIVES RISE TO A FEDERAL IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSE
OF ACTION UNDER THE ACT.
Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. (1980)
In 1972, Capital Equipment Leasing Corp. (Capital)' issued sub-
.ordinated debentures 2 under a trust indenture 3 which named defendant
First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co. (First Pennsylvania) as the
indenture trustee.4 In December 1978, Capital defaulted on its obli-
gations to pay interest, and subsequently filed a petition for reorganiza-
tion under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.5 Thereafter, several of
Capital's debenture holders filed separate class actions in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,6 alleging
that First Pennsylvania had breached certain duties 7 imposed upon it
1. Capital Equipment Leasing Corp. was the predecessor of the defendant,
,Capital First Corporation. Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 623 F.2d
,290, 292 (3d Cir. 1980).
2. The debentures were 9% subordinated debentures with a maturity date
.of May 31, 1982. Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 473 F. Supp. 201,
:203 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980). The debentures were
issued in the principal amount of $1,500,000. Id.
3. A trust indenture is a contract which defines the rights and responsibili-
ties of the corporate obligor, the bondholders, and the trustee of the indenture.
-V. KENNEDY & R. LANDAU, CORPORATE TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGE-
MENT 16-18 (2d ed. 1975).
4. 623 F.2d at 292. First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co. was the
-predecessor of defendant First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. Id.
5. Id. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1976) (repealed by the Bankruptcy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)). Chapter XI of the repealed
Bankruptcy Act provided for a summary procedure whereby judicial confirma-
tion of a plan or arrangement for payment of a debtor's unsecured debts
could be obtained with a minimum of court supervision. Id. See SEC v.
American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965). The purpose of Chapter
XI was the rehabilitation and the scaling down or rearrangement of the
debtor's unsecured debt. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1964).
,Chapter XI contemplated the settlement, satisfaction or extension of time for
the repayment of the debtor's unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 706-707 (1976).
The plan of arrangement must have been made in good faith and have been
feasible and in the best interests of the creditors. Id. §§ 766-767.
6. 473 F. Supp. at 203. The two class actions were filed on September
29, 1978 and December 27, 1978. Id. On January 5, 1979, the court ordered
the two class actions consolidated for all purposes. Id.
7. 623 F.2d at 292 n.1. The suit alleged that First Pennsylvania had: 1)
failed to segregate assets it had received as a creditor of Capital for a four
,month period immediately prior to Capital's default on the debentures, in
(761)
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by the Trust Indenture Act.8 The plaintiffs requested that the district
court imply a private federal remedy for violation of the Act by an
indenture trustee.9 First Pennsylvania moved to dismiss the actions
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.10 The defendants argued that
since the Act does not provide a federal cause of action, the debenture
holders' suit must be brought in a state court."
The district court denied First Pennsylvania's motions and held that
an implied federal cause of action exists under section 322 of the Act.'2
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit 13 affirmed the district court's decision, holding that
the Trust Indenture Act provides injured debenture holders with a
federal cause of action for the breach of terms mandated by the Act.
Zefiro v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 623 F. 2d 301 (3d Cir. 1980).
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 was enacted in response to wide-
spread abuses in the corporate bond market.14 In a report submitted
violation of § 311(a) of the Act; 2) failed to transmit certain reports to the
debenture holders and made misleading statements in the reports it did
submit, in violation of an indenture provision mandated by § 313 of the
Act; 3) failed to disqualify itself when a conflict of interest arose between
it and the debenture holders as required by an indenture provision man-
dated by § 310(a) of the Act; 4) failed to notify the debenture holders of
Capital's default, thereby violating an indenture provision mandated by
§ 315(b) of the Act; 5) failed to take several actions after Capital's default,
including actions to preserve the collateral securing the debentures, as man-
dated by § 315(c) of the Act; and 6) that First Pennsylvania was negligent
and violated its fiduciary obligations to the debenture holders. Id., citing 15
U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1976).
8. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976) (originally
enacted as Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (1939)).
9. 473 F. Supp. at 203-04.
10. 623 F.2d at 292. First Pennsylvania contended that the Act does not
expressly provide for either a federal cause of action for holders of debentures
subject to it or federal jurisdiction for such a suit. Id. Accordingly, First
Pennsylvania contended that the bondholders' suit must be brought in state
court. Id.
11. 473 F. Supp. at 203.
12. Id. at 210.
13. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Rosenn and Higginbotham and
Judge Layton of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
sitting by designation. Judge Rosenn wrote the majority opinion and Judge
Layton dissented.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb (1976). The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) appointed a committee to investigate and report on the subject
of trust indentures, pursuant to the authority granted by §211 of the Se-
curities Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §211, 48 Stat. 909 (1934) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 78jj (1976)). See SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND IN-
VESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PRO-
TECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, PART VI, TRUSTEES UNDER INDEN-
TURES (1936) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT]. In a summary of the
report which was submitted to Congress, the SEC found six major deficiencies
in the structure of trust indentures. See TRUST INDENTURES, HEARINGS ON H.R.
2191 AND 5220, BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
[VOL. 26: p. 761
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to Congress in June 1936, the Securities and Exchange Commission
,(SEC) concluded that it was in the public interest and required for the
protection of investors that the indenture trustees should be disqualified
from serving if they have interests which conflict with their fiduciary
,obligations and that indenture trustees be treated as active trustees with
the obligation to exercise the degree of care and diligence which the law
attaches to such fiduciary positions.15
The express purposes of the Act are threefold: 16 1) to provide full
and fair disclosure, not only at the time of original issue of bonds, notes,
'COMMERCE, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 224-26 (1939). The six major deficiencies noted
by the SEC were: 1) Trust indentures frequently failed to provide the trustee with
the necessary tools for making an effective check on the performance of even
the most important obligations assumed by the obligor in the indenture; 2)
The trust indentures commonly failed to require the obligor to make informa-
tive reports to the trustee; 3) The trust indentures usually did not require
the obligor to file with the trustee the names and addresses of all the bond-
holders under the indenture or to require the trustee to make such a list
available to the bondholders upon request, thereby making enforcement of
the indenture provisions through collective action almost impossible; 4) The
indenture did not impose a duty upon the trustee to notify the bondholders
of defaults by the obligor - in fact, the SEC found that most of the inden-
tures included an "ostrich clause" which permitted the trustee to close his
eyes to the occurrence of defaults, unless the holders of a specified percentage
of the bondholders formally notified the trustee of the defaults; 5) The
provisions of the indentures encouraged the trustees to be inactive in assert-
ing the rights of the bondholders through provisions absolving the trustee from
.any duty to act, unless it received notice of the default, demand for action
from a substantial number of bondholders, and sufficient indemnification for
the expense and the potential liability of the suit - additionally, the trustee
was usually exempted from liability for his actions, except for gross negligence
or willful misconduct; and 6) The indentures rarely contained provisions which
prohibited the indenture trustee from having interests which materially con-
flicted with the interests of the bondholders - in fact, the provisions of the
indentures often authorized the trustee to possess materially conflicting inter-
ests. Id. at 224-25. See generally Posner, Liability of the Trustee Under the
Corporate Indenture, 42 HAuv. L. REV. 198 (1928).
The SEC REPORT also indicated that there was no incentive for the trus-
tee, usually a commercial bank, to enforce the rights of the bondholders under
the indenture. SEC REPORT, supra, at 1-4. The trustees usually had business
interests with the bond issuers and the bond underwriters. Id. at 7-9. The
bond issuers wanted to bind as little property as necessary under the indenture
.and to be able to withdraw and substitute collateral at will. Id. at 10. Further,
the bond issuers wanted liberal opportunities to both avoid and postpone the
consequences of default. Id. The bond underwriters on the other hand, did
not impose strict provisions in the indenture since it would cause the issuer
to go to a less strict underwriter and it was unlikely that any of the under-
writer's customers would conclude that inadequate provisions in the indenture
caused their position against the obligor to be weakened by a loss in the amount
of security for the debt issue. Id. at 9-10. Accordingly, the financial interests
-of the trustee in maintaining good business relations with the issuer and the
underwriter precluded it from asserting the rights of the bondholders against
the issuer or demanding that the underwriter insert provisions in the inden-
ture which would adequately protect the bondholders. Id. at 7-10.
15. SEC REPORT, supra note 14, at 110-11.
16. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT ON
TRUST INDENTURE BILL OF 1939, H.R. REP. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
:25 (1939) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING
1980-81]
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debentures and similar securities, but throughout the life of such se-
curities; 17 2) to provide machinery for continuing disclosure to the
security holders, to allow them to protect their own group interest; 18
and 3) to assure that the security holders will have the services of a
disinterested indenture trustee who will conform to high standards of
conduct then observed only by the more conscientious trust institu-
tions.10 Congress viewed the inadequacies of the existing trust inden-
tures to be a national problem 20 and the Act, therefore, established
uniform statutory standards to which all trust indentures subject to
the Act must conform.21 Once the indenture is qualified, however, it is
up to the bondholders to enforce the provisions of the indenture.2 2
The implication doctrine allows a federal court to find that a
private cause of action was created by a federal statute which does not
expressly provide for such a remedy. 23 The rationale for the doctrine
rests in the inherent limitations which prevent Congress from fully
expressing its intent when exercising its law-making powers.2 4 Accord-
AND CURRENCY, REPORT ON TRUST INDENTURE ACT OF 1939, S. REP. No. 248,
76th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1939) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].




20. Both the Senate and the House Reports stated that "[to] the extent
that the types of trust indenture now in common use are inadequate, it is
clear that such inadequacy presents a national problem which cannot be
dealt with effectively by the States ....... SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at
3-4; HoUsE REPORT, supra note 16, at 25. Both reports further stated that in
dollar amounts, 80.2% of all bonds which would be subject to the Trust In-
denture Act were under trusteeships in Chicago and New York, even though
the bonds were issued among thousands of small investors in a number of
states which made individual enforcement of the indenture provisions imprac-
tical. SENATE REPORT, supra, at 3-8; HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 23-28.
21. See 15 U.S.C. §77ggg (1976). The Act requires any non-exempted
debt security to be qualified by the SEC before it can be offered to the public.
Id. An indenture is qualified when the party designated as the indenture
trustee meets the requirements of the Act and the indenture meets the require-
ments of §§ 310-318 of the Act, which impose substantive duties and minimum
standards on the indenture trustee. Id. §§ 77jjj-77rrr. See generally Com-
ment, Legislation: The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 105
(1940).
22. The structure of the Act was aimed at correcting deficiencies in the
corporate trust practices which were largely due to deficiencies in the trust
indentures themselves. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 26; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 16, at 8.
23. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Dis.
cretion In the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 797 (1957); Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285, 286 (1963); Comment, The Implication Doc-
trine after Touche Ross and Transamerica: The State of Implied Causes of
Action in Federal Regulatory Statutes, 26 VILL. L. REV. 433 (1981).
24. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring). See Mishkin, supra note 23, at 798-801. Among the inherent
[VOL. 26: p. 761
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ingly, since federal statutes do not always sufficiently articulate, and
therefore frustrate the execution of, the intent of Congress, 25 the re-
sponsibility falls upon the federal courts to determine whether the
statutory means of enforcement are inadequate to achieve the congres-
sional objectives, and if they are not, "to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the Congressional purpose." 26
The first federal court decision to explicitly recognize the implica-
tion doctrine was Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby.27 The Supreme
Court in Rigsby implied a private cause of action under the Federal
Safety Appliance Act 28 although the statute only provided for penal
sanctions for its violation. 29 In concluding that an injured party was
entitled to recover damages for the violation of the statute, the Court
stated that "[a] disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful
act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose espe-
cial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages
from the party in default is implied .... ." 30
Since Rigsby, federal courts have implied private federal causes of
action under the Constitution 31 and federal statutes 32 in order to safe-
limitations preventing Congress from fully expressing its intent are the time
pressures and the political realities involved in the legislative process. Id.
25. See Mishkin, supra note 23, at 798-801.
26. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). Some authorities
disagree with this active role of the federal courts in interpreting federal statutes
and implying remedies under the statutes if necessary to effectuate the con-
gressional intent. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 412-13 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In
Bivens, Chief Justice Burger stated that "[1]egislation is the business of con-
gress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task - as we do not".
Id. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
27. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
28. Federal Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (current ver-
sion at 45 U.S.C. §§1-16 (1976)).
29. 241 U.S. at 40. See 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (current version at 45 U.S.C.§§ 1-16 (1976)). In Rigsby, a railroad employee was injured as the result of
his employer's failure to comply with § 2 of the Federal Safety Appliance Act,
which required all railroad cars to have secure ladders. 241 U.S. at 37. How-
ever, the Act is no longer considered to provide a basis for an implied cause of
action. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934); Jacobsen
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953), af'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 909 (1954). This reflects a movement away from the "statutory tort"
approach adopted by the Rigsby Court to a stricter legislative intent ap.
proach. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text infra. See also Comment,
supra note 23, at 436-38.
30. 241 U.S. at 39.
31. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (U.S. CONST. amend. IV); Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678 (1946) (U.S. CONsT. amends. IV-V).
32. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976)); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Rivers and Harbours Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§409 (1976)); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(Labor Management Relations Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)); Tunstall v.
5
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guard interests to which Congress or the Constitution had provided in-
adequate protection. 8 In J.1. Case Co. v. Borak,34 the Court limited
its implication of private federal actions to cases where implication was,
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute. 35 If the implication
of a federal private cause of action was not consistent with the intent
of the federal statute or did not effectuate the purposes intended to be-
served by the statute, the courts did not imply a private remedy.8 8
In Cort v. Ash,3, the Supreme Court established a more refined
and restrictive test for determining whether an implied private federal
remedy exists under a federal statute.8 In holding that a private fed-
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976)); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691
(2d Cir. 1947) (Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)).
33. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring); Mishkin, supra note 23, at 798-801.
34. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
35. Id. at 433. In 1.I. Case, the Supreme Court held that shareholders
have an implied federal right, under § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act), to bring suit for the violation of § 14(a) of the 1934 Act,
even though § 14(a) is silent as to a private cause of action thereunder. Id.
at 432-33. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa, 78n(a) (1976). The J.I. Case Court based
its holding on its findings that: 1) the protection of investors is among the
chief purposes of § 14; 2) private enforcement of § 14 provides a necessary
supplement to SEC actions; and 3) available state remedies are not adequate
since state laws provided no liability for the commission of acts that violate
§ 14(a). 377 U.S. at 432-35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
36. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n. of R.R.
Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453 (1974). In Amtrak, an action was instituted
by an association of railroad passengers seeking injunctions against the dis-
continuance of certain passenger trains which allegedly violated the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act). 414 U.S. at 454-55. See 45 U.S.C.
§§ 501-645 (1976). The intent of Congress in passing the Amtrak Act was to
achieve economic viability in a basic rail passenger system. 414 U.S. at 461.
Congress provided an efficient procedure in the Amtrak Act to allow Amtrak
to eliminate uneconomical routes without submitting to time consuming state
regulatory proceedings. Id., citing 45 U.S.C. § 564 (1976). In refusing to
recognize a private right of action, the Amtrak Court enunciated a two-prong
test for implying federal causes of actions under federal statutes: the private
cause of action must: 1) be consistent with the legislative intent of the statute
in question and 2) effectuate the purposes intended to be served by the statute.
Id. at 458. The Court held that since a private cause of action under the
Amtrak Act would "completely undercut the efficient apparatus that Congress
sought to provide for Amtrak in the paring of uneconomic routes", no private
federal cause of action existed under the Act. Id. at 463.
37. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
38. Id. at 78. In Cort, suit was brought by a stockholder of Bethlehem
Steel Corp. against the corporation and its directors, seeking an injunction
and damages for alleged corporate contributions to federal election campaigns
in violation of § 610 of the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Elections Cam-
paign Act (Campaign Act). Id. at 71-72. See 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976) (repealed
1976). Section 610 of the Campaign Act provided only penal sanctions for
violations of the Act. 422 U.S. at 78. The primary purpose of the Campaign
Act was to free federal elections from the influence of liberal campaign con-
tributions by big business. Id. at 81-82. For a discussion of the Cort test,
see notes 40 & 52-57 and accompanying text infra.
[VOL. 26: p. 761
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eral cause of action could not be implied in favor of shareholders of
corporate contributors for a violation of the Federal Elections Campaign
Act of 1974,89 the Court established a four part test:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial bene-
fit the statute was enacted," . . that is, does the statute create
a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one?... Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law? 40
In the 1979 cases of Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 4 1 and
39. 422 U.S. at 78, citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n.
of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453 (1974); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964). For a discussion of Rigsby, Amtrak and J.1. Case, see notes
26-30 & 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
40. 422 U.S. at 78, quoting Texas and Pacific R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
at 39 (emphasis in the Cort opinion) (citations omitted). Applying these fac-
tors to determine whether there was an implied remedy under § 610 of the
Campaign Act, the Court noted that: 1) the protection of ordinary sharehold-
ers and internal corporate shareholder relations was at best a secondary con-
cern of the statute; 2) an implied private federal cause of action for violation
of §610 of the Campaign Act would not effectuate the primary purpose of
the statute - the elimination of the influence of large corporate campaign
contributions in federal elections; and 3) the subject matter of the cause of
action, the internal affairs of a corporation, should be governed by state law
and is traditionally relegated to state law. Id. at 81-85. Therefore, the court
concluded that no implied private federal cause of action exists under § 610
of the Campaign Act. Id. at 85. For a brief discussion of the facts of Cort,
see note 38 supra.
41. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Touche Ross, the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC) and the court appointed trustee for the liquidated securi-
ties brokerage firm of Weis Securities, Inc. (Weis), instituted a lawsuit against
Touche Ross 8c Co., a certified public accounting firm which was employed by
Weis from 1969 to 1973. Id. at 563. In this capacity, Touche Ross Sc Co.
audited the books and records of Weis and prepared the reports which Weis
was required to file annually with the SEC by § 17 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and the rules and regulations adopted thereunder.
Id. at 563-64. See 15 U.S.C. §78q(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-5 (1980).
The suit alleged that Touche Ross Sc Co. improperly audited and certified
Weis' books and records, thereby breaching § 17(a) of the 1934 Act; and
prevented the disclosure of Weis' financial condition until it was too late to
forestall liquidation or to lessen the adverse financial impact of liquidation on
the brokerage firm's customers. 442 U.S. at 565-66.
The Supreme Court determined that since § 17(a) merely required the
filing of records and did not confer any federal rights, Congress did not intend
to create an implied private federal remedy for the violation of § 17(a). Id.
at 569-71, citing 15 U.S.C. § 78(q)(a) (1976). The Court further stated that
§ 18(a) of the 1934 Act confers an express federal private cause of action for
parties who purchased or sold securities on the reliance of misleading records
1980-81]
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Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 42 the Court applied
the four factors enumerated in the Cort decision. 43 However, in de-
termining whether a federal remedy should be implied, the Court stated
that the sole test was whether Congress intended to create a remedy
under the statute.4 4 The other Cort factors were treated only as in-
filed with the SEC. 442 U.S. at 572-73, citing 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). The
Court additionally stated that § 27 of the SEC Act does not create any cause
of action or impose any liability. 442 U.S. at 577, citing 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1976). The Court noted that this section simply grants jurisdiction to the
federal courts and provides for venue and service of process. Id.
42. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). In Transamerica, the shareholder of a real estate
investment trust (trust) instituted a derivative suit on behalf of the trust, al-
leging that certain trustees had violated §§ 206 & 215 of the Investment Ad-
visors Act of 1940 (Advisors Act). Id. at 13-17, citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6;
80b-15 (1976).
The Court determined that the language of § 215, which provides that
contracts whose execution or performance violates the Advisors Act are void,
necessarily creates a remedy and the right to litigate whether a contract is
void. 444 U.S. at 18-19. The Court concluded that because a federal right
is involved, the applicable forum is necessarily the federal courts. Id. With
respect to § 206 of the Advisors Act, which only proscribes fraudulent prac-
tices by investment advisors, the Court determined that it did not give rise
to an implied federal remedy. Id. at 247. The Court reasoned that since
Congress expressly provided both judicial and administrative remedies for the
enforcement of § 206 in the Advisors Act, it clearly did not intend to provide
a private cause of action for shareholders for the violation of § 206, even
though the statute was intended to protect shareholders by prohibiting fraudu-
lent practices. Id.
43. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 15-24;
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 568-76.
44. The Court in Touche Ross began its analysis by looking at the first
Cort factor, whether the federal statute in question was enacted for the bene-
fit of a class. 442 U.S. at 568-70. The Court concluded that § 17(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was simply a reporting statute and did not
create any federal rights in favor of any identifiable class. Id. at 569-70. In
considering the second Cort factor, whether there was any legislative history
which indicates the intent of Congress to create an implied private remedy
or to deny one, the Touche Ross Court concluded that the legislative history
of the statute was silent as to the private remedies available under the Act.
Id. at 571. The Court then stated that in cases like this, the inquiry into
whether a private federal remedy is implied under the federal statute under
consideration ends at this point as the issue "has been definitely answered in
the negative". Id. at 576. The Court stated further that "[t]he central inquiry
remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication,
a private cause of action," and that the Court had never decided that the four
Cort factors are entitled to equal weight. Id. at 575. Accordingly, the third
and fourth Cort factors, whether the implication of a private federal remedy
would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the federal statute under
consideration and whether the cause of action involved is one traditionally
relegated to state law, were not even considered. See id. See generally
Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and
Redington, 68 GEo. L.J. 163, 172-85 (1979).
The Court in Transamerica noted that § 206 of the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940 was intended to protect the advisor's clients from prohibited
fraudulent practices and thereby satisfied the first Cort factor. 444 U.S. at
24. Thus, Transamerica is distinguishable from Touche Ross where the first
Cort factor was not satisfied. See note 41 supra. The Transamerica Court
stated however, that even though §206 was intended to protect a specified
[VOL. 26: p. 761
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quiries helpful in determining the intent of Congress.4 5
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether holders
of bonds, issued under an indenture subject to the Trust Indenture
Act, have an implied private federal cause of action under the Act for
the violation by the trustee of provisions of the indenture mandated
by the Act.4 6 The district courts that have addressed the issue have
implied private federal causes of action for bondholders under inden-
tures subject to the Act.4 7
class, this protection does not require the implication of a private federal
remedy. 444 U.S. at 249. The Court refused to consider arguments con-
cerning the third and fourth Cort factors; whether the implication of a pri-
vate federal remedy would be consistent with the underlying purpose of § 206
and whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.
Id. at 24. The Court noted that Touche Ross does not require a consideration
of these factors. Id., citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at
575. It is therefore submitted that after Transamerica, in order for a court
to find an implied private cause of action, it must find that Congress intended
to create such a remedy, as this appears to be the touchstone of Transamerica.
45. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 15-16,
23-24; Touche Ross 8c Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 575-76. In Touche Ross,
the Supreme Court did not even consider the third and fourth Cort factors:
whether the implication of a private federal remedy would be consistent with
the underlying purposes of the federal statute and whether the cause of action
involved is one traditionally relegated to state law. 442 U.S. at 575-76.
In Transamerica, the Court went one step beyond its decision in Touche
Ross and indicated that only if there was evidence that Congress intended to
create a private federal remedy. would it imply a private remedy under a
federal statute. 444 U.S. at 15-16, 23-24.
46. The Supreme Court left this issue open in Caplin v. Marine Midland
Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 426 n.17 (1972). In Caplin, the Supreme Court
held that a Chapter X reorganization trustee did not have standing to assert
claims for the failure to fulfill the terms of the indenture against the inden-
ture trustee on behalf of the debtor's bondholders. Id. at 434. The reor-
ganization trustee asserted that the indenture trustee failed to prevent the
debenture issuer from violating certain indenture provisions, thereby violating§ 315 of the Act. Id. at 425-26. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (1976). In a footnote,
however, the Caplin Court suggested that the bondholders under an indenture
would have a federal cause of action against an indenture trustee who acted
negligently or with willful misconduct, in violation of § 315 of the Act. 406
U.S. at 426 n.17.
47. In re Mathews v. Fisher, [1978] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,336
(S.D. Ohio); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litigation, 416 F. Supp.
161 (C.D. Cal. 1976) aff'd, 603 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1979); Morris v. Cantor, 390
F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
In Morris, the court determined that § 315 of the Act created a private
right of action for bondholders for the enforcement of duties placed upon the
indenture trustee by the Act. 390 F. Supp. at 822-23. The Morris court did
not apply the Cort test, but based its decision on the grounds that the Act
required certain provisions to be included in indentures, the violation of which
created liability. Id.
In Equity Funding Corp., the district court for the Central District of
California followed the reasoning of the Morris court. 416 F. Supp. at 203.
In Mathews, the district court for the Southern District of Ohio applied the
four factor test of Cort and determined that all of the Cort factors supported
the implication of a private federal remedy under the Indenture Act. [1978]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 97,336. Accordingly, the court concluded that
holders of bonds under an indenture subject to the Trust Indenture Act have
9
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Against this background, the Third Circuit in Zeffiro was con-
fronted with the issue of whether holders of bonds issued under an
indenture subject to the Act have an implied private federal cause of
action for the violation by the indenture trustee of the provisions of
the indenture mandated by the Act.48 The court began its analysis
by outlining the structure and the background of the Act.49 The court
specifically recognized that the Act is limited to indirectly establishing
a standard for indentures by requiring certain provisions to be in-
cluded in the bond indentures in order for the underlying debt to be
qualified or registered by the SEC.50 As the court expressly recognized,
however, once the indenture is qualified, "the enforcement of the terms
of the indenture is left to the parties." 51
Turning to the issue of whether a private federal cause of action
should be implied under the Act, the court applied the four part test
established by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, as limited by Touche
a private federal cause of action under the Act for the violation by the in-
denture trustee of provisions of the indenture mandated by the Act. Id. at
97,229.
48. 623 F.2d at 292.
49. Id. at 292-93. The court noted that the study conducted by the SEC
in 1936 revealed widespread abuses in the issuance of corporate bonds under
indentures. Id. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra. The main
problems identified by the study were that the indenture trustees were fre-
quently aligned with the issuer of the debentures and that wide dispersal of
the debenture holders made joint action for the enforcement of their rights
difficult. 623 F.2d at 292-93. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
50. 623 F.2d at 293. See 15 U.S.C. § 77iii (1976); notes 21-22 and accom-
panying text supra.
51. 623 F.2d at 294-95. The court rejected the argument that § 322 of
the Act provides an express federal remedy for the violation of the Act by
an indenture trustee. Id. Section 322(b) of the Act provides that jurisdiction
and venue for suits relating to the violation of the provisions of the Act, is
as set forth in § 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act). 15 U.S.C.
§ 77vvv(b) (1976). Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) [T]he district courts of the United States, and the United States Courts
of any Territory, shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations un-
der this subchapter and under the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Commission in respect thereto, and concurrent with State and Terri-
torial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this subchapter ...
Id. § 77v(a).
The Zeffiro court noted that the Supreme Court had held in Touche Ross
that § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), "creates no cause
of action of its own force and effect". 623 F.2d at 294, citing Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 577. The court also noted that the opera-
tive language of § 322 of the Trust Indenture Act is identical to the language
of § 27 of the 1934 Act. 623 F.2d at 294.
The Zefliro court refused to follow the approach of the district court for
the Southern District of New York, which had held that there is an express
cause of action under the Act without applying the Cort analysis. Id. at
295, citing Morris v. Cantor, 390 F. Supp. 817, 822-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See
note 47 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 26: p. 761
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Ross and Transamerica.52 Looking at the language and the legislative
history of the Act, the Third Circuit concluded that: 1) debenture
holders are the primary beneficiaries of, and the special class protected
by, the Act; 58 2) the enforcement of the indenture provisions is left to
the bondholders; 54 3) the exercise of federal jurisdiction is necessary
to effectuate the purposes of the Act; 55 and 4) the enforcement of the
indenture provisions mandated by the Act is not a matter traditionally
relegated to state law.56 Thus, the court found that all four Curt
52. 623 F.2d at 296-301. For a discussion of the Cort test, see notes 37-40
and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the limitations placed on
the Cort test by Touche Ross and Transamerica, see notes 41-45 and ac-
companying text supra.
53. 623 F.2d at 296-97. In determining whether the bondholders are mem-
bers of the class for whose "especial benefit" the statute was enacted, the first
Cort factor, the court cited § 302 of the Act which states in relevant part that
the purpose of the Act is to benefit the "national public interest and the in-
terest of investors" and the legislative history of the Act, which indicates that
the philosophy of the Act was the protection of the interests of the security
holders via the requirement of mandatory provisions in indentures. Id. at
297. See 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb (1979); SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 8; HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 16, at 26; HEARINGS ON H.R. 10292 BEFORE A SUBCOMMITEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 75th Cong., 3rd
Sess. 19-29, 57 (1939). [Hereinafter cited as HEARINGS].
54. 623 F.2d at 297-99. In discussing the second Cort factor, whether a
federal remedy was intended for the violation of the Act, the court cited the
Senate and House Hearings on the Act which indicated that the enforcement
of the qualified indentures was to be left to the bondholders themselves. Id.
at 297-98, citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 26; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 16, at 8. The court noted that while the legislative history of the Act
does not explicitly deal with an investor's right to bring suit in federal court,
the legislative history does provide unequivocal evidence that bondholders were
intended to be able to sue for breach of the indenture provisions. 623 F.2d
at 298. Since the court gleamed from the legislative history that Congress
intended to nationalize the issues of concern in the Act, the court concluded
that the federal court was the proper forum. Id. at 301.
55. 623 F.2d at 299-300. In determining whether a federal remedy would
be consistent with the underlying purposes of the Act, the third Cort factor,
the court stated that since the Trust Indenture Act was enacted to solve a
national problem in a uniform way and there is no federal administrative en-
forcement of the Act, the exercise of federal jurisdiction is necessary to effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act. Id., citing HousE REPORT, supra note 16, at
25-27; SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 3-4.
56. 623 F.2d at 300-01. The court stated that unlike general contract law,
"[t]he interpretation of the mandated terms in the indenture agreement will
not depend on the intent of the parties but on the meaning of the Act."
Id. at 301. The Zeffiro court distinguished the instant case from the Su-
preme Court's decision in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court refused to imply a cause of action
under § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in favor
of minority shareholders who were frozen out in a short form merger. Id. at
478-80. See 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1980). The
Santa Fe Court determined that the regulation of the duties of fiduciaries were
traditionally relegated to state law. 430 U.S. at 478. The Third Circuit stated
that the issue in Zefiro was the construction of a federal statute and not the
standard for fiduciary duties, as was the issue in Santa Fe. 623 F.2d at 301.
1980-81]
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factors supported the existence of an implied federal cause of action
under the Act.57
In a brief dissent, District Judge Layton stated that the congres-
sional intent behind the Act points more toward a state remedy for
violation of the Act. 8 Judge Layton further stated that since inden-
tures are contracts and contracts are enforced in the state courts, the
remedy for violation of the indenture provisions mandated by the Act
is necessarily a state remedy.59
Reviewing the Third Circuit's opinion, it is submitted that the
Third Circuit properly applied the Cort test, as refined by Touche Ross
and Transamerica, in determining whether a private federal cause of
action is implied under the Trust Indenture Act.0 0 Under this test,
the central inquiry is whether Congress intended to create a private
remedy under the statute in question. 6' It is suggested that the
Zeffiro court was correct in its assertion that Congress intended to pro-
vide a uniform solution to the national problems of concern in the
Act 62 and that it would undermine this congressional intent to relegate
a cause of action under the Act to the state courts - an action which
would result in indenture trustees being held to different standards
because of diverse interpretations of the Act by courts not subject to a
unified national system of appeals.63 As the Zeffiro court stated, "it
would be anomalous for Congress to mandate uniform provisions and
57. 623 F.2d at 301.
58. Id. at 301-03 (Layton, J., dissenting). judge Layton argued that the
Committee hearings preceding the passage of the Act indicated that Congress
intended a state remedy. Id. Judge Layton noted the testimony of Justice
Douglas, then Commissioner of the SEC, that once the indenture had been
qualified, the indenture would be "enforceable, in the same manner as any
other contract is enforceable, in the same manner that indentures presently
executed are enforceable". Id. at 302 (Layton, J., dissenting), citing HEARINGS,
supra note 53, at 22 (remarks of Chairman Douglas). Accordingly, Judge
Layton opined that the purpose of the Act was to create uniform inden-
tures, not a uniform forum. 623 F.2d at 302 (Layton, J., dissenting).
59. 623 F.2d at 302-03 (Layton, J., dissenting).
60. For a discussion of the Zeffiro court's application of the Cort test, see
notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
61. For a discussion of the Cort test as refined by Touche Ross and
Transamerica, see notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
62. See 623 F.2d at 299; note 55 and accompanying text supra.
63. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 3-4. In Transamerica, the
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether, absent any congressional
indication, the implied private federal cause of action under §215 of the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 was required to be brought in state courts.
444 U.S. at 19. The Court stated that "we decline to adopt such an anomalous
construction ... without some indication that Congress in fact wished to remit
the litigation of a federal right to state courts." Id. at 19 n.8. The same issue was
present in Zeffiro. See 623 F.2d at 299-300. The Trust Indenture Act created
uniform federal provisions which indentures subject to the Act must contain.
For a discussion of the Trust Indenture Act, see note 21, supra. It is there-
fore submitted that based on the language in Transamerica, violations of the
Trust Indenture Act should not be relegated to state court systems.
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then allow the interpretations of those provisions to vary with the
choice of forum." 64 Accordingly, it is submitted that an implied
federal cause of action under the Act must clearly have been intended by
Congress as it provides the only effective enforcement mechanism for
the uniform fiduciary standard for indenture trustees and for effectu-
ating Congress's efforts to provide protection for investors. 65
It is further submitted that while the Zeffiro court overemphasized
the importance of the three Cort factors other than congressional in-
tent,66 since these factors would not support the implication of a private
cause of action in the absence of a congressional intent to do so,67
their support for the implication of a private federal remedy under the
Act adds further support to the Zefliro court's finding of congressional
intent.
First, the primary beneficiaries of the Trust Indenture Act, as
evidenced by section 302 and its legislative history, are the bond-
holders.68 This factor leaves ZeLliro factually distinguishable from
Cort, where the primary purpose of the Campaign Act was not the
protection of shareholders, but the elimination of corporate influence
in federal elections through large campaign contributions. 9 Thus,
Zefliro is also unlike Touche Ross, where the federal statute merely
64. 623 F.2d at 299 n.25. The court further stated that:
[Ilt is especially difficult to believe that Congress intended exclusive
interpretation of indentures to be in state courts when it is realized
that, at the time of the passage of the Act, 26 states had not had
trusteeships under indentures filed with the SEC for the preceding
two and one-half years. Thus, 26 states would have had little or no
experience in the intricacies of indenture agreements.
Id., citing 84 CONG. REC. 5021 (1939) (remarks of Sen. Miller).
65. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
66. For the Zefllro court's analysis of the other three Cort factors, see 623
F.2d at 296-301; notes 53 & 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
67. Touche Ross and Transamerica have limited the Cort analysis to the
single issue of whether there is evidence that Congress intended to create a
private federal cause of action under the federal statute involved. For a
discussion of the Cort test and the role of the three other Cort factors under
Touche Ross and Transamerica, see notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 77bbbb (1976); SENATE REPORT, supra note 16; HousE
REPORT, supra note 16. The Trust Indenture Act was passed by Congress
for the express purpose of protecting bondholders. See notes 14-15 and ac-
companying text supra. One of the express purposes of the Indenture Act
was to provide disclosure by the indenture, so that bondholders under the
indenture could protect themselves. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the Zeffiro Court's reliance on § 302 of the In-
denture Act, see note 53 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 81-82; notes 37-38 & 40 and accompanying
text supra. In Cort, the Court determined that the primary purpose of the
Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 was to assure that
federal elections are free from the power of money and that the "protection
of ordinary stockholders was at best a secondary concern". 422 U.S. at 81-82.
See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
1980-81]
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required the submission of reports. 7 0 It is submitted that the existence
of this factor shows that Congress intended the bondholders to enforce
the indenture provisions and have a cause of action under the Trust
Indenture Act.
Second, an implied private federal remedy would be consistent
with the underlying purpose and structure of the Trust Indenture Act.
The Act requires continuing full and fair disclosure by the indenture
issuer and the inclusion of certain mandatory provisions in the in-
denture. 71 Once the indenture is qualified, Congress intended that the
bondholders under the indenture would themselves enforce the provi-
sions of the indenture 72 without the continuing supervision of a gov-
ernment agency. 73 In view of the mandated uniform federal indenture
provisions drafted by Congress, it is submitted that the only cause of
action that would be consistent with the structure of the Trust Inden-
ture Act would be a private federal cause of action, which would pro-
vide a uniform interpretation of the mandatory provisions. 74
Finally, the enforcement of indenture provisions mandated by the
Act is not a function traditionally relegated to state law, as it involves
the interpretation of a federal statute which expressly gives exclusive
jurisdiction for actions arising under it to the federal courts. 75 Further-
more, it is submitted that as the J.I. Case Court recognized in a similar
70. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 569-70; notes 41 &
43-45 and accompanying text supra. In Touche Ross, the Supreme Court
determined that § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 merely re-
quired the filing of financial reports with the SEC and Congress did not
intend to create a private federal remedy for the violation of § 17(a). 442
U.S. at 569-70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
71. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 1-12; HousE REPORT, supra note
16, at 23-27.
72. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ddd(c), (d), (e); 77eee(a), (c); 77ggg; 77sss; and 77ttt;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 8; House REPORT, supra note 16, at 27.
For a discussion of the structure of the Trust Indenture Act, see notes 16-22
and accompanying text supra.
73. SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 8; HousE REPORT, supra note 16,
at 25, 27.
74. 623 F.2d at 299-300. The Zefllro court recognized that a state remedy
would result in varied interpretations of the uniform provisions of the Act.
Id. at 299 n.25. The court also recognized that the key goal in the drafting
of the Act was to approach the deficiencies of the trust indentures in a uniform
way. Id. at 299, citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 3; HEARINGS, supra
note 53, at 18, 31.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv(b) (1976). For a discussion of § 22(a) of the Trust
Indenture Act, see note 51 supra. This is unlike the situations in Cort and
Santa Fe, which were concerned with internal corporate affairs and corporate
fiduciary actions, which have been traditionally relegated to state courts. For
a discussion of Cort, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of Santa Fe, see note 56 supra.
Although Judge Layton was correct in her assertion that the indenture
is a contract, it is submitted that interpretation of this contract is not tradi-
tionally relegated to state law, because of the unique provisions mandated by
federal law and the need for uniform interpretation.
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situation,7 the state hurdles of separate and multiple suits and the
difficulty in bringing all the required parties together in state courts
would result in ineffective relief and failure to fulfill the purposes of the
Act.77 This factor supports finding a congressional intent to provide
a private federal remedy under the Trust Indenture Act as there is no
federal administrative enforcement of the indentures once they are
qualified, 78 and if the bondholders would be required to enforce the
indenture provisions in state court, the result would be conflicting
interpretation of the uniform provisions of the Act.79
The Third Circuit's decision in Zefiro expands the enforcement
rights of bondholders under indentures subject to the Trust Indenture
Act and will allow bondholders to institute class actions in federal
court to enforce the provisions of the indenture and to recover damages
for breach of duty by the indenture trustee.8 0 The federal remedy will
effectuate the congressional intent to increase the bondholders protec-
tion and will avoid the barriers associated with state remedies.81
By opening the door of the federal court to aggrieved bondholders, the
Third Circuit has allowed bondholders to efficiently enforce their rights
under trust indenture provisions mandated by the Trust Indenture
Act.
Finally, although the action of the Third Circuit bodes well for
bondholders in need of the protection of the Act, it should be noted
that the court's concern with the three Cort elements other than con-
gressional intent 82 may be misplaced in light of the clear mandate of
the Supreme Court in Touche Ross and Transamerica.8 3 In addition,
in view of the Court's warnings that it will no longer be liberal in
implying private remedies and its accompanying suggestion that Con-
gress explicitly provide for private remedies where they intend them
76. For a discussion of J.L Case, see notes 34-35 and accompanying text
supra.
77. 377 U.S. 426, 434-35. See note 35 and accompanying text supra. The
J.I. Case Court stated that "the hurdles that the victim might face [in bring-
ing suit in state court] (such as separate suits, security for expenses statutes,
bringing in all parties necessary for complete relief, etc.) might well prove
insuperable to effective relief." 377 U.S. at 435.
78. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ddd(c),(d),(e); 77eee(a),(c); 77ggg; 77sss; 77ttt
(1976).
79. For a discussion of the structure of the Act and the necessity for the
bondholders to be able to enforce the indenture provisions in federal court,
see notes 21-22 & 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
80. See 623 F.2d at 301. Under § 1004 of the proposed Federal Securities
Code, federal civil liability remedy for the violation of the Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, is expressly provided. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1305 (1980).
The governing provision of the Federal Securities Code states that the pro-
visions of the Federal Securities Code will be "interpreted, applied, and en-
forced exclusively as a matter of Federal Law". Id.
81. See notes 35 & 77 and accompanying text supra.
82. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
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to exist s 4 it is suggested that, at least as to statutes enacted after Touche
Ross and Transamerica, the issue of congressional intent itself may be
irrelevant in the absence of an express private cause of action.8 5
Rudi Grueneberg
84. See Comment, supra note 23, at 443-50. See also Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979); id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist noted that Congress should read the Court's opinion as
putting them on notice that "the ball, so to speak, may well now be in its
court." 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
85. See Comment, supra note 23, at 468.
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FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION - RULE lOb-5 - CAUSE OF
ACTION Is ASSERTED UNDER RULE 1Ob-5 WHERE MINORITY SHARE-
HOLDER ALLEGES A MATERIAL NONDISCLOSURE BY DEFENDANTS
THAT DEPRIVED HIM OF A STATE INJUNCTIVE REMEDY
AGAINST A MERGER.
Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc. (1980)
Michael J. Healey, Jr., a twenty percent shareholder in Catalyst
Regeneration Services, Inc. (Catalyst),' refused to sell his interest in
Catalyst to SCR, Inc., which had previously purchased the other eighty
percent interest in Catalyst.2 During purchase negotiations, Healey
requested certain information from SCR regarding its financial, organi-
zational, and ownership structure, which was not provided to him.3
When continued efforts to obtain Healey's twenty percent stock interest
proved unsuccessful, 4 the shareholders of SCR set out to eliminate
Healey's minority interest through a merger of Catalyst with Catalyst
Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc. (Catalyst of Pa.), a newly formed and
1. Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 643-44 (3d Cir.
1980), rev'g 463 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Pa. 1979). The plaintiff had become a
20% shareholder and president of Catalyst Regeneration Services, Inc., a
Texas corporation, in the spring of 1972. Id. at 643. A group of Texas in-
vestors owned the other 80% of Catalyst's stock. 463 F. Supp. at 741. Catalyst
set up its only plant in Pennsylvania. 616 F.2d at 643.
2. 616 F.2d at 644. In November of 1975, all of the shareholders of
Catalyst, other than the plaintiff, agreed in principle to sell their 80% in-
terest at a price of $5.25 per share. Id. at 643. On March 2, 1976, SCR
purchased 80%/ of the Catalyst stock pursuant to the November agreement. Id.
at 644.
3. Id. at 643-45. Healey testified at trial that, in December 1975, he had
requested information from the defendants which included the long and short
range plans for SCR, the identity of SCR board members and shareholders,
and other similar information. Id. at 643. In the course of negotiations,
Healey submitted a proposed purchase option and a request for an employ-
ment contract but SCR replied that it would only buy Healey's shares on the
same terms as the other 80% of the shares. Id. at 643-44. In late February of
1976, Healey travelled to Baltimore to meet with members of the buying
group at which he again requested a five-year plan for SCR and asked whether
selling expenses for other Catalyst shareholders would be paid. Id. at 644.
On April 27, Healey's attorney sent a letter to a member of the buying group
requesting six categories of information including: 1) the rationale for fixing
the rate of exchange of the Catalyst common stock for the SCR preferred
stock; 2) the identity of persons who fixed the exchange rates and their pos-
sible conflicts of interest; 3) recent audited financial statements of SCR; 4)
an independent evaluation of the Catalyst stock; 5) an independent evaluation
of the SCR preferred stock; and 6) other material information concerning
SCR. Id. at 644 n.2.
4. Id. at 644. Discussions took place between Healey and representatives
of the defendants through February, March, and April of 1976. Id.
(777)
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wholly-owned subsidiary of SCR. 5 The terms of the merger agreement
provided that Healey would receive non-voting preferred shares 6 of
SCR, Inc. in exchange for his voting interest in Catalyst.7 The plaintiff
brought suit one week after the merger was consummated, seeking an
injunction and damages 8 under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 9 and rule lOb-5 10 promulgated thereunder, al-
leging that if he had been given the requested information he would
have tried to enjoin the merger in state court.1 ' The United States
5. 463 F. Supp. at 742. Catalyst of Pa. was incorporated in Maryland in
early April of 1976 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of SCR. 616 F.2d at 644.
SCR then transferred its own preferred shares to Catalyst of Pa. Id.
6. 463 F. Supp. at 742. Preferred shares of a corporation enjoy a prefer-
ence with respect to earnings (dividends) or net assets (liquidations) or both.
H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 160 (2d ed. 1970). When more than one
class of stock is authorized, the articles of incorporation, or, in some juris-
dictions, the Statement of Terms, of the corporation must set forth the desig-
nations, preferences, limitations and relative rights of each class. Id. Shares
may or may not have voting rights, depending upon the provisions of the
articles of incorporation. Id. § 189.
7. 616 F.2d at 644. Under the proposed merger, if the Catalyst share-
holders voted to approve, they would then transfer their Catalyst shares to
Catalyst of Pa. in return for the SCR preferred shares. Id. On May 3, 1976,
SCR voted its 80% of the Catalyst stock to approve the merger between
Catalyst and Catalyst of Pa. Id. at 645. The merger then became effective on
June 30, 1976. Id.
8. 463 F. Supp. at 742. For a discussion of implied civil remedies under
section 10(b), see note 36 infra.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
11. 616 F.2d at 645. Healey claimed that without the requested informa-
tion he could not provide a judge with sufficient reason to issue an injunc.
tion. Id. at 645 n.4.
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District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania entered judg-
ment on a jury verdict for the plaintiff,12 concluding that the evidence
sustained the finding of a causal connection between the defendants'
misrepresentations or omissions and the plaintiff's alleged loss.1" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 14 reversed and
remanded for further proceedings more fully consistent with its analysis,
holding that, while there is a cause of action under rule 10b-5 when a
misrepresentation or omission of material information deprives a minor-
ity shareholder of an opportunity to enjoin a merger through state law,
the minority shareholder asserting such a claim must demonstrate that,
at the time of the misrepresentation or omission, there was a reasonable
probability of ultimate success, under state law, in securing an in-
junction absent such misrepresentation or omission. Healey v. Catalyst
Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980).
Congress enacted section 10(b) of the 1934 Act in order to protect
investors from "inequitable and unfair practices" involving securities.1"
This broad statement of purpose, viewed against the sparse legislative
and administrative history of the Act,16 has left much of the develop-
ment of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, which prohibit the use of manip-
ulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities,17 to the courts.' 8 Although a clear-cut test for determining
12. 463 F. Supp. at 740.
13. Id. at 743.
14. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz, Judge Aldisert, and District
Judge Huyett of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Chief Judge Seitz wrote the majority
opinion and Judge Aldisert wrote a dissenting opinion.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-2 (1934) and S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934) (con-
taining report of President Roosevelt's message delivered prior to passage of
Act, which contains a similar statement of purpose); 1. A. BROMBERG, SECURTMES
LAw: FRAUD § 2.2, at 2.22-.24 (1977).
16. The Supreme Court has noted that "[n]either the intended scope of
§ 10(b) nor the reasons for the changes in its operative language are revealed
explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which deals primarily
with other aspects of the legislation." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 202 (1976). The only specific reference to § 10 in the Senate report on
the 1934 Act merely states that the section was "aimed at those manipulative
and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). See also 5 A.
JACOBS, THE IMPACr OF RUtE lOb-5, § 5 (Ist rev. ed. 1980).
The administrative history of rule lob-5 is so scant that courts have been
unable to look to it for guidance in interpreting the rule. Id. § 5.02. The
SEC release promulgating the rule was itself a very short document. See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
17. For the text of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see notes 9 & 10 supra.
18. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 16, § 6.01. In discussing the purpose of
rule 1Ob-5, Jacobs has stated that the case law refers "to no less than eight
policies underlying the Rule: (1) maintaining free securities markets; 2)
equalizing access to information; (3) insuring equal bargaining strength; (4)
providing for disclosure; (5) protecting investors; (6) assuring fairness; (7)
1980-81]
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the elements of a rule lOb-5 cause of action has not yet been enunciated,
there are certain common areas of inquiry that courts repeatedly
examine in determining whether a 1Ob-5 violation has occurred. 19
Various courts have discussed questions regarding the requirement of
the existence of fraud or a manipulative or deceptive device,20 the
requirement of a purchase or sale of securities in order to establish
standing,21 and the requirement that the purchase or sale of securities
take place "in connection with" the alleged fraud.22 In addition, courts
building investor confidence; and (8) deterring violations while compensating
victims." Id. Since these policies overlap, a court may rely upon any com-
bination of them in deciding a claim under rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) (free markets, fairness, disclosure, pro-
tecting investors, equal access, and equalization of bargaining position); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969) (fairness, equal access, deterrence, free markets, disclosure, and
protecting the investing public).
19. See 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 16, § 36.
20. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The types of
practices considered fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive have been expand-
ing. Prior to its most recent considerations of rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court
had viewed rule lOb-5 as remedial in nature and therefore worthy of a liberal
construction. The Court has stated: "[W]e are guided by the familiar canon
of statutoly construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes. The Securities Exchange Act quite clearly falls into
the category of remedial legislation." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967) (footnote omitted) (deciding the scope of the definition of "security" in
a lob-5 case). Although the Court in Tcherepnin was referring generally to
the 1934 Act, more recent lower court cases have applied its reasoning to
lOb-5 causes of action. See, e.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 410 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522
F.2d 84, 90 (5th Cir. 1975); Spilker v. Shayne Laboratories, Inc., 520 F.2d 523,
525 (9th Cir. 1975).
21. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). Birnbaum established the rule that a plaintiff
must have been either a purchaser or a seller of the securities involved in the
fraud to maintain a lOb-5 action. The Birnbaum rule was adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975). Writing for the majority in Blue Chip Stamps, Justice Rehn-
quist stated: "The virtue of the Birnbaum rule ... is that it limits the class
of plaintiffs to those who have at least dealt in the security to which the pro-
spectus, representation or omission relates." Id. at 747.
22. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971). In Bankers Life, the leading case dealing with the "in connection
with" provision of § 10(b), the Court held that, in order to invoke the pro-
tection of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, a party must be defrauded "as a result
of deceptive practices touching its sale [or purchase] of securities .... " Id.
at 12-13. The Third Circuit interpreted the broad language of Bankers Life
in Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940
(1977), noted in The Third Circuit Review, 23 VILL. L. REV. 846 (1977). The
Ketchum court held that the complaint failed to allege that a misrepresenta-
tion was rendered "in connection with" the sale or purchase of a security
where the allegation was that the defendants failed to disclose a plan to re-
move the plaintiffs from their offices in the corporation, which plan set in
operation a chain of events that culminated in the forced sale of the plaintiffs'
shares of stock in the corporation. 557 F.2d at 1027.
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have examined issues of materiality, 28 reliance on the fraud,24 and
scienter. 25
Since its adoption in 1942 to fill a perceived gap in the federal secu-
rities law,26 the importance and application of rule 10b-5 27 have re-
sulted in some areas of uncertainty, one of which has been the role
of rule lOb-5 in the context of corporate fiduciary duties to minority
shareholders. 28 The reach of rule 1Ob-5 in corporate merger cases was
23. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (ma-
teriality under rule 14a-9). For a discussion of the materiality requirement,
see notes 38-39 & 41 and accompanying text infra.
24. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In
Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court held that "positive proof of reliance is not
a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be
material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of this decision." Id. at 153-54. For an illustration
of courts applying the Affiliated Ute standard regarding reliance, see Thomas
v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc.,
496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976).
25. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder,
the Supreme Court held that section 10(b) "was addressed to practices that
involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for
negligent conduct alone." Id. at 201. The Court defined "scienter" in Hoch-
felder as "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193. For a dis-
cussion of the scienter requirement after Hochfelder, see Note, Recklessness
Formulation of Scienter Requirement Under Rule 10b-5, 25 VILL. L. REV.
1082 (1980); Note, Beyond Hochfelder: Is There a Scienter Requirement in
SEC Suits for Injunctive Relief?, 22 VILL. L. REV. 1238 (1977).
The Supreme Court recently held that scienter must also be shown in
SEC injunction actions brought under § 10(b) and rule lob-5 as well as
§ 17(a)(l) of the Securities Act of 1933. SEC v. Aaron, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Variations of "Recklessness" After Hochfelder
and Aaron, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 179 (1980).
26. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 16, § 2. For a discussion of the common law
protection in existence prior to the adoption of rule lOb-5, see id. § 2-2.05.
Although the federal securities laws constituted an extensive statutory scheme
of securities regulation, they did not provide a cause of action to remedy the
fraudulent acts of a purchaser or reach corporate mismanagement. Id. § 3.
Rule lOb-5 was adopted effective May 21, 1942 to fill this perceived gap in
the network of federal securities law. Securities Exchange Act Release No.
3230 (May 21, 1942).
27. One commentator has stated that "[tlhis antifraud and antimanipula-
tive rule is certainly the most important securities provision in the United
States." 5 A. JAcOBs, supra note 16, § 1. Another commentator has observed
that "[ilf Rule [10b-5] stood alone as a source of private civil remedies, its
terms would be broad enough to blanket almost all malpractices in securities
transactions." Note, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy
for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.I. 1120, 1130 (1950). Accord, Courtland
v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Rule 10b-5 "is
now . . . considered to support private litigation for practically any sin of
omission or commission which may be imagined in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of a security"); Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977) (section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are together
the cornerstone of federal securities regulation).
28. Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d at 645. See Alabama
Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602
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greatly restricted in 1977 by the nearly unanimous decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.2 9
In Santa Fe, minority shareholders brought suit under rule 1Ob-5, chal-
lenging the fairness of the terms of a short form merger effectuated
under Delaware law.30 The complaint, according to the district court,
did not allege either a material misrepresentation or a failure to disclose
(5th Cir. 1979) (corporate stock repurchase plan allegedly begun to enable
management to perpetuate its control of corporation); Kidwell ex rel. Penfold
v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979) (sale of "sister" corporation); Gold-
berg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978)
(subsidiary's issuance of stock to its parent corporation); Wright v. Heizer
Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978) (pledge
of corporation's assets).
For a discussion of Goldberg v. Meridor, see notes 43-50 and accompanying
text infra. For a discussion of Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, see notes
51-54 and accompanying text infra.
29. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Eight justices concurred in the holding of the
case and Justice Brennan dissented. In Part IV of the Santa Fe opinion,
the Court stated additional considerations "that weigh heavily against per-
mitting a cause of action under Rule lOb-5 for the breach of corporate fiduciary
duty .... ." Id. at 477. Specifically, the Court observed that "once full and
fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at
most a tangential concern of the statute," and that cases involving breach of
corporate fiduciary duty are among those "traditionally relegated to state
law." Id. at 477-78. Justices Blackmun and Stevens did not accept Part
IV of the opinion, contending that it was unnecessary to the disposition of
the case. Id. at 480 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id. at 480-81 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part). For a discussion of these alternative policy consid-
erations, see note 36 and accompanying text infra.
Many federal courts have looked upon Santa Fe as a statement of the
Court's wish to curtail the remedies available under rule lOb-5. See, e.g.,
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (allegation
of libel); Voege v. Magnavox Co., 439 F. Supp. 935 (D. Del. 1977) (court
would not construe state law to determine it attorney's opinion in proxy
statements was correct); O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust
Co., 431 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir.
1977) (allegation of trust mismanagement).
30. 430 U.S. at 467. The Delaware short-form merger statute enables a
parent company owning at least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to merge
with the subsidiary, upon approval of the parent company's board of directors,
and to make cash payments for the shares owned by the minority sharehold-
ers. Id. at 465, citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974 &c Supp. 1977). Al-
though advance notice to or consent of the minority shareholders is not
required, they must be notified within 10 days of the merger's effective date
and any dissatisfied minority shareholder may petition the Delaware Court of
Chancery for the payment of the fair value of his shares as determined by
a court-appointed appraiser subject to court review. 430 U.S. at 465, citing
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974 & Supp. 1977). Pursuant to § 253, the
defendant corporation in Santa Fe merged with its subsidiary based solely
on the approval of its board of directors. 430 U.S. at 465. Consequently,
the subsidiary's minority stockholders' sole remedy provided by the Delaware
General Corporation Law was the exercise of appraisal rights. Id. at 474
n.14, citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974 & Supp. 1977). The Delaware
Supreme Court has since held that, under Delaware law, both the long
and short-form mergers may be enjoined if they are consummated for the sole
purpose of freezing out the minority shareholders. Roland Int'l Corp. v.
Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969
(Del. 1977).
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material information.31 The Supreme Court held that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action since the language of both section 10(b)
and rule 1Ob-5 required some kind of improper flow of information,
whether it be deception, misrepresentation, manipulation, or nondis-
closure.32 The Court also noted that the failure to provide notice of
the merger was not material within the meaning of section 10(b) or
rule 1Ob-5 since the then-current view of the federal courts was that the
merger could not have been enjoined under Delaware law.33 Although
the Court recognized that corporate conduct which involves both a
breach of fiduciary duty and deception is actionable under rule 10b-5,34
the Court stated that when the "essence of the complaint is that share-
holders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary," redress should be sought
under the state corporation law.35 Without a clear indication of Con-
gressional intent, the Court was "reluctant to federalize the substantial
portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in secu-
31. 430 U.S. at 474-76. The plaintiffs in Santa Fe contended that the
merger constituted a violation of rule lOb-5 because it lacked a valid business
purpose, constituted an "act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud," and omitted to state material facts since the
parent corporation failed to give prior notice of its intention to effectuate the
merger. Id. at 467-68.
32. Id. at 474-77. The Court defined manipulation as referring "gener-
ally to practices such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." Id.
at 476. The Court, however, did not specifically define deception, misrepre-
sentation, or nondisclosure. Id. at 474-77.
33. Id. at 474 n.14. For a further discussion of the materiality require-
ment, see notes 38-39 & 41 and accompanying text infra.
34. 430 U.S. at 474-76. See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128 (1972) (misstatements of material fact used by bank employees
in position of market maker to acquire stock at less than fair value); Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9 (1971) (seller of bonds
was duped into believing that it, the seller, would receive the proceeds). Cf.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (injunction
under Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to compel registered investment adviser
to disclose to his clients his own financial interest in his recommendations).
35. 430 U.S. at 477-79. The Court also noted that "[c]orporations are
creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors
on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern
the internal affairs of the corporation." Id. at 479, quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (emphasis added by the Santa Fe Court).
It is generally agreed that state law has always been, and still is,
the traditional source of corporation regulation. See Jennings, Federaliza.
tion of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAW 991, 991
(1976). However, many have argued that federal law should assume a leader-
ship role in the regulation of corporations. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc.,
533 F.2d 1283, 1286 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See also
Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B. J. 409,
426 (1968) (predicting that state law, since it is more permissive of manage-
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rities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regula-
tion would be overridden." 30
The standard of materiality applied by the Court in Santa Fe 7
previously had been set out by the Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.,38 a case arising under rule 14a-9 39 adopted under the
36. 430 U.S. at 479. Although the Court found that the language of sec-
tion 10(b) was "sufficiently clear in its context" to be dispositive of Santa Fe,
the Court in Part IV of its opinion set forth additional considerations "that
weigh heavily against permitting a cause of action under Rule lOb-5 for the
breach of corporate fiduciary duty alleged in this complaint." Id. at 477.
Noting that the Congress did not expressly provide a private cause of action
for violations of section 10(b), the Court recognized that a private cause of
action under the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act should not be implied
where it is "unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purposes" in
adopting the Act. Id., quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1,
41 (1977). Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964). An im-
plied cause of action under § 10(b) has been recognized in some circumstances
since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Fratt v. Robinson, 203
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). The Fratt court explained the reason for implying
a private cause of action, stating that: "We can think of nothing that would
tend more toward discouraging . . . fraudulent practices in security trans-
actions and thus make the Act more 'reasonably complete and effective' than
the right of defrauded sellers or buyers of securities to seek redress for dam-
ages in federal courts." 203 F.2d at 632. See also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (private cause of action
in antitrust suit); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
195 (1963) (private cause of action to enforce Investment Advisors Act of 1940).
See generally Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent As Defenses in Private Anti-
trust Suits, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1241 (1965).
The Santa Fe Court further noted that, since the fundamental purpose of
the 1934 Act was the implementation of a "philosophy of full disclosure,"
once full and fair disclosure has occurred, "the fairness of the terms of the
transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute." 430 U.S. at 478.
The Court expressed its reluctance to recognize a cause of action to serve what
was "at best a subsidiary purpose" of the federal legislation. Id. See Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975).
Another factor noted by the Santa Fe court as important to the determina-
tion of whether Congress intended to create a federal cause of action in cir-
cumstances such as these, is whether the cause of action is one that has
traditionally been relegated to state law. 430 U.S. at 478. See Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 40; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
37. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14. In finding nonmateriality, the Santa Fe Court
reasoned that, since the plaintiffs could not have enjoined the merger under
Delaware law, and did not indicate in what way they might have acted dif-
ferently if they had been given the information they sought, the failure to
give advance notice of the merger was not a material nondisclosure. Id.
38. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
39. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-9 (1980). Although the Supreme Court in TSC
was actually defining materiality for purposes of rule 14a-9, because that rule's
mandate against false and misleading proxy statements is analogous to rule
lob-5, the same test has also been held applicable to cases arising under rule
lOb-5. See Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., Inc., 571 F.2d 737, 741 & n.5 (2d Cir.
1978) (TSC standard of materiality applicable to 10b-5 action charging insider
with not revealing information when plaintiff redeemed stock); Joyce v. Joyce
Beverages, Inc., 571 F.2d 703, 707 & n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905
(1978) (TSC standard of materiality applies to lOb-5 complaints of alleged omis-
[VOL. 26: p. 777
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1934 Act.4 ° The Court in TSC defined materiality as "a showing of a
substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted
fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder." 41 Applying this test, the Supreme Court
found no 1Ob-5 cause of action in Santa Fe in part because the plaintiffs
had failed to indicate how they could have used the information denied
them, since their only possible remedy under state law was appraisal.42
In Goldberg v. Meridor,48 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit distinguished Santa Fe partially on the ground that
the plaintiff in Goldberg could have sought an injunction against the
transaction under New York law.44 In Goldberg, a derivative action
was brought on behalf of a corporate subsidiary challenging a trans-
action whereby the subsidiary issued shares of its stock to its parent in
return for all of the parent's assets and liabilities. 45 The transaction
sions on informational statement provided pursuant to exchange of stock);
Rochez Bros., v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
993 (1976) (test of materiality when defendant bought plaintiff's stock without
informing him of possible future sale is whether reasonable man would attach
importance to facts in determining his choice of actions).
40. Rule 14a-9 was adopted under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1976).
41. 426 U.S. at 449. The Court alternatively stated the standard as
requiring a showing of "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." Id. The
Court noted that the standard of materiality adopted was supported by the
SEC. Id. at 450 n.10, citing Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission
as Amicus Curiae at 13, TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438
(1976).
42. 430 U.S. at 474 n.14. The Court noted that since the appraisal pro-
ceeding was the sole remedy in Delaware for any alleged unfairness in the
terms of the merger, the failure to give advance notice of the merger was not
a material nondisclosure within the meaning of § 10(b) or rule lOb-5. Id.
For a further discussion of applicable Delaware law, see note 30 supra.
43. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
44. 567 F.2d at 218-19. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 720 (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1979). In Goldberg, however, the suit-provoking transaction was not of
the sort that would afford the subsidiary's shareholders any right of appraisal.
See 567 F.2d at 219.
45. 567 F.2d at 211. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged
in a conspiracy to cause Universal Gas and Oil Company, Inc. (UGO) (a
subsidiary of Maritimecor) to raise funds from the public through a public
offering and then use the proceeds and other assets of UGO for the benefit
of Maritimecor and Maritime Fruit (Maritimecor's controlling parent). Id.
In May of 1972, the defendants caused UGO to issue a prospectus offering
stock and debentures for sale, which stated that all the proceeds of the offer-
ing would be used to finance the construction and purchase of three tankers
for the transportation of liquified gas. Id. In 1974, the defendants caused
UGO to sell the contracts for two of the vessels, on which sale a profit of
$14,000,000 was realized. Id. During 1974, and up to August 1975, the de-
fendants caused UGO to make $7,000,000 worth of loans to Maritimecor. Id.
In August 1975, the transactions culminated in an agreement providing for
UGO's issuance to Maritimecor of up to 4,200,000 shares of UGO stock and its
assumption of all of Maritimecor's liabilities, including the debt owed to UGO,
1980-81]
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was challenged on the grounds that the terms of the transaction were
unfair to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary and violated
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 46 The court held that, since the share-
holders were not informed that some of the subsidiary's directors were
controlled by the parent corporation with which they were dealing, and
were not fully informed of facts that would have shown the inadequacy
of the consideration for the subsidiary's stock, a cause of action existed
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.47 After analyzing the Supreme
Court's decision in Santa Fe,48 the Goldberg court concluded that, al-
though the subsidiary's directors had acted on their own and no share-
holder vote was required to carry out the issuance of stock under the
plan,49 the shareholders were deceived because they were lulled into a
false sense of complacency by the misleading disclosure.50
In Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle,51 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit allowed a rule 1Ob-5 cause of action
under circumstances similar to those in Goldberg.6 2 The court in
in consideration of the transfer of all of Maritimecor's assets - except 2,800,000
UGO shares already held by Maritimecor. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 218-19.
48. See id. at 217-18. The Goldberg court read Santa Fe as rejecting the
lower court's position "that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders,
without any deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, violates the statute
and the Rule." Id. at 218, citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at
476. See also Green v. Santa Fe Indus,, Inc., 553 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Further, the Goldberg court did not interpret
Santa Fe as holding that no action lies under rule lOb-5 when a controlling
corporation causes a publicly owned subsidiary to sell its securities to the
parent in a fraudulent transaction and fails to make, or makes a misleading,
disclosure. 567 F.2d at 217-18. For a further discussion of Santa Fe, see
notes 29-36 and accompanying text supra.
49. 567 F.2d at 218.
50. Id. at 220. Commentators have varied as to whether the Second Cir-
cuit's holding in Goldberg is consistent with the policy considerations set forth
in Santa Fe. Compare Note, Deception and Materiality Requirements in
Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 66 GEo. L.J. 1593, 1611 (1978) ("Goldberg
restricts lob-5 to its historic role as a supplement to state law") and Note,
Allegation That Controlling Stockholder Imposed on the Corporation a Securi-
ties Transaction Adverse to the Corporation's Best Interests by Misstating
Material Facts to the Minority Stockholders States a Claim Under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 861, 876 (1978) (Goldberg consistent
with prior case law and accords with the policies of section 10(b)) with Note,
Rule 10b-5 and Dissipation of Corporate Assets: The De-Greening of Securi-
ties Law, 44 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 1271, 1293 (1978) (rules governing intra-
corporate conduct should be established and enforced by the states alone) and
Note, Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit's Resurrection of Rule lOb-5
Liability for Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders,
64 VA. L. REv. 765, 777 (1978) (Goldberg permits federal courts to promulgate
uniform fiduciary standards to govern mergers in direct contravention of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of congressional intent in Santa Fe).
51. 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
52. See id. at 1291-92. In Kidwell, as in Goldberg, the deceived share.
holders were not entitled to vote on the transactions in question. Id. The
[VOL. 26: p. 777
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss3/8
1980-81] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
Kidwell accepted and expanded Goldberg's requirements 53 for a lOb-5
suit, holding that no relief would be available under rule lOb-5 unless
a minority shareholder would have succeeded in obtaining permanent
injunctive relief, or damages in excess of an appraisal remedy, in the
state court action. 54
Noting that the role of rule lOb-5 in the context of mergers
effected under state law has been a recurring problem in recent years,
55
the Third Circuit began its consideration of Healey by comparing the
Second Circuit's holding in Goldberg v. Meridor56 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Santa Fe.5 7 The Third Circuit found Goldberg to
be sufficiently distinguishable to have warranted a result different from
that reached in Santa Fe.5 ' The Healey court, recognizing that the
Ninth Circuit found material the fact that four directors of a nonprofit mem-
bership corporation owned an interest in a "sister" for-profit corporation which
was to be sold along with the nonprofit corporation, on which sale the share-
holders of the for-profit corporation would reap a profit. Id. at 1293. The
court allowed the lob-5 cause of action on behalf of the nonprofit corporation,
believing that full disclosure of the conflict of interest to all members was
required in connection with a meeting called for purposes of an advisory vote.
Id.
53. For a discussion of Goldberg's requirements, see notes 47-50 and
accompanying text supra.
54. 597 F.2d at 1294. Initially the court noted that minority members of
an Idaho nonprofit cooperative membership corporation could have brought
a derivative suit under Idaho law to block the sale of the corporation's assets,
in view of allegations that four directors were shareholders of a for-profit sis-
ter corporation, that no notice that both corporations were to be sold was
given to members of the nonprofit corporation, that the nonprofit corporation
received only a small consideration for its assets, that shareholders of the for-
profit corporation received an undisclosed profit, and that the only disclosure
came in an ambiguous notice followed by a disorderly meeting attended by
fewer than half of the members of the nonprofit corporation. Id. at 1292.
The Kidwell court then applied the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe
and found themselves foreclosed from holding that a minority shareholder can
recover on the corporation's behalf under rule lob-5 merely because the state
court complaint would have stated a cause of action. Id. at 1294. The Ninth
Circuit found the question to be essentially one of fact, stating that "the
federal trial judge should decide any legal issues that would have arisen in
the hypothetical state suit as a matter of law in the Rule lOb-5 suit." Id. Cf.
Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d at 220 (no requirement that the attempt to
secure the injunction would have been successful).
55. 616 F.2d at 645. For a partial listing of cases dealing with this prob-
lem, see note 28 supra.
56. For a discussion of Goldberg, see notes 43-50 and accompanying text
supra.
57. 616 F.2d at 645-46, citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). For a discussion of Santa Fe, see notes 29-37 and accompanying text
supra.
58. 616 F.2d at 646. In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court expressly noted
that there had been no misinformation connected with the merger. 430 U.S.
at 474. The situation was different in Goldberg, where the plaintiffs had
claimed that a parent corporation had either not disclosed, or misleadingly
disclosed, information concerning its sale of the overvalued assets of its con-
trolled subsidiary, some of the shares of which were held by the public. 567
F.2d at 211-13, 221.
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mere existence of a state injunctive remedy was insufficient to dis-
tinguish Santa Fe,50 found the crucial difference between Santa Fe and
the case at bar to be that, in the latter, there was a misrepresentation or
omission in the flow of information between the majority and minority
shareholders.6 0
Noting the strong federal interest in ensuring a proper flow of
information between the parties to a securities transaction, 61 the Third
Circuit concluded that a situation in which some misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant prevents the plaintiff from stopping the
merger through a state injunction action is precisely the type of situa-
tion to which rule 1Ob-5 is addressed. 62 The court read Santa Fe as
cautioning not against mere federal judicial intrusion into areas of state
law, but rather against such intrusion without explicit federal statutory
authority.68
The Healey court determined that the fact that the harm caused
by the omission was a deprivation of a state remedy in no sense dimin-
ished the federal interest in preventing the omission and thereby
insuring the full disclosure of all material information in securities
transactions. 64 The Third Circuit further reasoned that, since the
Supreme Court has permitted an action under the federal securities
laws to contest mergers concluded under state law where there has been
59. 616 F.2d at 646. In Goldberg, however, the Second Circuit noted
"that the availability of an injunctive action under New York law constituted
a sufficient basis for distinguishing the conclusion [in Green] with respect to
materiality." 567 F.2d at 220, citing SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. 558
F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of this distinction, see note
44 and accompanying text supra.
60. 616 F.2d at 646. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
61. 616 F.2d at 646. The court noted that the Supreme Court has sanc-
tioned a private cause of action under rule lOb-5, on behalf of sellers of securi-
ties to enforce that interest. Id. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
at 477; Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life 8, Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971). For a discussion of the federal interest in ensuring a proper flow of
information between the parties to a securities transaction, see notes 15 & 32
and accompanying text supra.
62. 616 F.2d at 646-47. The court relied on the strong federal interest in
ensuring a proper flow of information between the parties to a securities trans-
action, as evidenced by the importance of rule lob-5 and the entire field of
federal securities regulation, in reaching its conclusion. Id. at 646. For a
discussion of the purpose of rule lob-5 and the reasons behind its adoption,
see notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
63. 616 F.2d at 646. The Third Circuit found that "[w]hat was objec-
tionable in Santa Fe was use of rule lOb-5 by the federal courts to override
traditional areas of state law '[aibsent a clear indication of congressional in-
tent.'" Id., citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 479. For a
discussion of the important role of state corporate law, see note 35 supra.
64. 616 F.2d 646. The court noted that the deprivation of state rights and
remedies often forms the basis for federal claims. Id., citing P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 500-06 (2d ed. 1973) (federal habeas corpus review of
state court convictions and Supreme Court review on direct appeal of depriva-
tions of federal constitutional rights in state court proceedings).
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an improper flow of information in violation of a specific federal pro-
vision, 65 Santa Fe should not be read as preventing a federal remedy
for the harm which flows from the very conduct that the federal secu-
rities laws were designed to prevent.66
Turning to the elements of a lOb-5 cause of action, 7 the court ex-
pressed the view that the issue of whether the plaintiff must establish
that he would have actually been granted the state court injunction 6
was best viewed as an aspect of the materiality requirement.69 Applying
the materiality standard defined by the Supreme Court in TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,7 o the Third Circuit held that, in order to
establish the actual significance of the omitted information, "the
plaintiff must demonstrate that at the time of the misrepresentation or
omission, there was a reasonable probability of ultimate success in secur-
ing an injunction had there been no misrepresentation or omission." '
The court justified its refusal to follow the Ninth Circuit's Kidwell
standard,72 which spoke in terms of actual success, by noting that
65. 616 F.2d at 646, citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438 (1976) (violation of rule 14a-9 proxy requirements).
66. 616 F.2d at 647. The court noted that federal courts have a duty un-
der the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution to ensure that
federal interests are vindicated. Id. at 646, citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The court noted further that the United
States Supreme Court has sanctioned a private cause of action under rule
lob-5 to enforce that federal interest. Id., citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. at 477; Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 19 n.9 (1971).
67. 616 F.2d at 647. For a discussion of the elements of a cause of action
under rule lOb-5, see notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
68. The Healey court noted that, although Goldberg did not expressly
consider the issue, Kidwell requires that the plaintiff must prove that he
would have obtained the injunction had he been given the information in
question. 616 F.2d at 645, citing Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d
1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
69. 616 F.2d at 647. The court found that the concerns regarding the
lack of an improper flow of information expressed by the Court in Santa Fe
were not present in Healey and, therefore, that Santa Fe was not particularly
helpful in deciding whether there must be proof that the plaintiff had a chance
of success in his state law action for an injunction in order to make the
improper flow of information material for rule lob-5 purposes. Id. For a
further discussion of the concerns expressed by the Court in Santa Fe, see
note 36 and accompanying text supra.
The Third Circuit also stated that any problems of causation would be
adequately disposed of through the application of objective materiality cri-
teria. 616 F.2d at 649. For a discussion of rule lOb-5 materiality, see notes
37-42 and accompanying text supra.
70. 426 U.S. at 449. For a discussion of the standard of materiality set
forth in TSC, see notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra.
71. 616 F.2d at 647 (emphasis added).
72. Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
For a discussion of the standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Kidwell, see
notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
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absolute certainty is both an impossible goal and a difficult concept for
a jury to implement, and remanded the case for further proceedings.78
Dissenting from the opinion of the court, Judge Aldisert expressed
the view that the plaintiff's action should have been dismissed since it
did not further the policies of the federal securities laws 74 and inter-
fered with and usurped "functions traditionally relegated to state
corporate law." 7r The dissent argued that since Healey's vote was not
necessary to complete the merger, 76 and state appraisal remedies for
dissenting shareholders did exist in Texas, 77 the nondisclosures were
not material as a matter of law.7 8 Judge Aldisert further observed that
the majority's opinion suggested that a different standard of materiality
under federal securities law applies when state remedies are available
than when they are not.7 9 Noting the recent Supreme Court decisions
73. 616 F.2d at 647. The court also noted that, in most cases, the state
remedy would be a preliminary injunction, which itself looks only to the
reasonable probability of ultimate success. Id.
74. 616 F.2d at 651 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert argued that
"Healey's action serves only to protect his state breach of fiduciary duty action,
which deals with a concern - fairness - that is 'at best a subsidiary purpose'
of the federal Legislation." Id. at 657 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), quoting Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 478. For a discussion of functions tradi.
tionally relegated to state corporate law, see note 35 and accompanying text
supra.
75. 616 F.2d at 651 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert relied on
the policy considerations expressed by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe as man-
dating dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. Id. He especially relied on the
Supreme Court's statement that "once full and fair disclosure has occurred,
the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern
of the statute." Id. at 657 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), quoting Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 480 U.S. at 478. For a general discussion of the policy con-
siderations in Santa Fe, see notes 29-36 and accompanying text supra.
76. 616 F.2d at 651 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id. For a discussion of why judge Aldisert found the nondisclosures
to be non-material, see note 79 infra. The adequacy of the appraisal remedy
has, however, been called into question by various commentators. See, e.g.,
Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1023-25 (1975);
Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HAiv. L. REV. 1189 (1964).
79. 616 F.2d at 653 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). In Judge Aldisert's view,
the majority erred in assuming that the existence of state injunctive relief was,
in this context, the only component of materiality. Id. In footnote 14 of its
Santa Fe opinion, the Supreme Court stated that the alleged nondisclosures
in Santa Fe were not material because the plaintiff's votes were unnecessary to
effect the merger under the Delaware short-form merger statute and that the
plaintiffs could not have obtained an injunction under state law even if the
undisclosed information demonstrated that the transaction was unfair. 430
U.S. at 474 n.14. Although he recognized that no other component was men-
tioned in footnote 14 of Santa Fe, Judge Aldisert was unwilling to accept the
majority's reading of a footnote as the comprehensive statement on material-
ity in this important area of securities law. 616 F.2d at 653 (Aldisert, J., dis-
senting). Judge Aldisert further stated that, since Healey's votes were
unnecessary to complete the merger, he had no investment decision to make.
and, therefore, the purpose of the federal securities laws - promoting a full
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which restrict any excessively expansive reading of the liability pro-
visions of the federal securities acts,8 0 the dissent disapproved of the
recent expansion of rule 1Ob-5 by the various courts of appeals to
include claims sounding in state law.8 ' Judge Aldisert concluded that,
since the entire thrust of Healey's claim was that the terms of the
merger were unfair to him, Healey could best be provided relief in the
state court system. s
2
and fair disclosure - was fulfilled by the disclosure to Healey of his options
to either tender his stock or seek appraisal. Id. at 654 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
Since Healey would have then been unable to aver that he had been deprived
of "material information," an essential ingredient of a rule lob-5 action, Judge
Aldisert would have dismissed his action. Id.
80. 616 F.2d at 655 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), citing Transamerica Mort.
Adv., Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no private cause of action for damages
under section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (employees' noncontributory, com-
pulsory pension plan is not a security within the meaning of the Securities
Acts); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (absent allegations
of manipulation or deception, no lob-5 cause of action exists for simple breach
of fiduciary duty to minority stockholders); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977) (defeated tender offeror has no implied cause of action for
damages under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act or under rule lOb-5); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter needed to establish a lob-5
violation); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only
actual purchasers and sellers of the security may recover for violation of rule
lOb-5).
81. 616 F.2d at 655-56 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent labelled the
recent decisions by various courts of appeals concerning rule lob-5 in the
merger context as " a classic example of illicit precedential inbreeding in which
a number of decisions are cited to support a legal precept, although none of
them provides a fair statement of reasons for the conclusion." Id. at 656
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a list of the cases to which the dissent refers,
see note 28 supra.
82. 616 F.2d at 657-61 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert also relied
on the four-part test for determining whether a private plaintiff can maintain
an action for damages when he is harmed by the defendant's breach of a
federal statutory obligation enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975). 616 F.2d at 657 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). As subsequently
interpreted, the four elements to be considered are: (1) whether the statute
was enacted for the benefit of an "especial" class of which the plaintiff is a
member; (2) whether the legislation intended to create a private remedy; (3)
whether creation of a private remedy would further the underlying purpose of
the legislative scheme; and (4) whether implication of a private remedy is
inappropriate because the subject matter involves an area basically of con-
cern to the states. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
The dissent believed that Healey failed to satisfy the third and fourth require-
ments of Cort and Cannon. 616 F.2d at 657 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge
Aldisert would have held that Healey's private action did not meet the third
Cort requirement since it did not further the policies embodied in the securi-
ties laws. Id. Although Healey did allege nondisclosure, the dissent believed
that the entire thrust of Healey's state claim for injunctive relief would have
been that the terms of the merger were unfair to him. Id. The dissent also
believed that Healey's action entered an area traditionally relegated to state
law, making his implied federal remedy inappropriate under the fourth Cort
test as well. Id. at 658 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert noted that a
clearer example of a plaintiff asking federal courts to usurp state functions
would be difficult to imagine. Id.
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Although the Supreme Court has recently indicated its predis-
position to prevent the expansion of the federal securities laws into
areas of corporate mismanagement 8 it is submitted that the Third
Circuit's holding in Healey properly applied the standards set forth in
Santa Fe 4 to find that a cause of action existed under the circum-
stances present in Healey.8 5 The Court's principal concern in Santa Fe
was the possibility that, despite full disclosure and no improper flow of
information, defendants might be found liable under rule lOb-5 solely
on the basis of the unfairness of the transaction, a result which the
Court viewed as beyond the purpose and intent of Congress in enacting
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.8 6 Under the Third Circuit's analysis in
Healey, however, it is not the unfairness of the transaction that results
in the cause of action, but the improper flow of information made
material by a reasonable probability that the information sought would
have led to the granting of an injunction against the merger.8S
It is submitted that Healey should not be read as broadly imposing
a substantive duty of fairness on a corporation which is seeking to
merge with another corporation. It is suggested that the Third Circuit
properly read and applied Santa Fe, and held only that, when arranging
a merger, the parent corporation must transmit material information to
those who could prudently use it in evaluating the merits of the trans-
action.8 8 Rather than interfering with the state corporation law, rule
I Ob-5, as applied in Healey, serves to enhance the role of state law by
ensuring that shareholders are able to seek the full panoply of rights
that the state provides them,89 armed with all of the information
necessary to make their decisions intelligently.9 0 It is suggested that
the need for such information is especially important in the case of
83. See notes 29-36 and accompanying text supra.
84. 616 F.2d at 645-46, citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). For a discussion of Santa Fe, see notes 29-36 and accompanying text
supra.
85. For a discussion of the facts of Healey, see notes 1-7 and accompanying
text supra.
86. See 430 U.S. at 477-80. For a discussion of the Santa Fe Court's con-
cerns, see notes 29-36 and accompanying text supra.
87. See 616 F.2d at 647-48. The Third Circuit did not extensively address
the fairness question; rather it analyzed only whether there was an omission
of material information. See id. at 645-48.
88. See id. at 647-48. Rule lOb-5 and Santa Fe require the disclosure of
material information to enable a shareholder to make an informed investment
decision. See notes 18 & 36 supra.
89. For a discussion of the aims of state law as opposed to federal law, see
note 35 and accompanying text supra.
90. The Supreme Court has described the "fundamental purpose" of the
Securities Exchange Act as "implementing a philosophy of full disclosure."
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 478. See note 36 supra.
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corporate mergers since the problem of fashioning relief after the con-
summation of the merger is particularly acute.9 1
Although the dissent believed that the approach of the majority
would require the federal court to resolve claims which the dissent
characterized as nothing more than a breach of fiduciary duty,92 it is
submitted that the majority correctly observed that the plaintiff's al-
legations implicated the central policy behind section 10(b) and rule
l0b-5.Pa Thus, as the majority correctly pointed out, the state law
.appraisal remedy and the remedy available for nondisclosure under
the federal securities laws are separate, and serve distinct purposes. 9 4
Since state law generally imposes no duty on directors to disclose in-
formation,9 5 shareholders must rely on federal securities law to ensure
that a corporation provides enough material information to allow
intelligent decision-making 0
It is further submitted that by requiring a showing of a reasonable
probability that a shareholder could have used the requested informa-
tion to obtain an injunction as an aspect of materiality,9 7 the Third
Circuit prevented the mere existence of a state injunctive remedy from
sanctioning a 1Ob-5 cause of action for every nondisclosure, no matter
how minor and irrelevant the information.9 8 Rather, it is apparent
that the court properly applied the generally accepted TSC definition
of materiality 99 to a merger transaction, where the relevant investment
decision facing a shareholder is whether to contest the merger in state
court by seeking an injunction. 100
91. Injunctive relief may become impossible once the merger has been
onsummated. See 616 F.2d at 652 n.2 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a dis-
cussion of the adequacy of the appraisal remedy, see note 78 supra.
92. See 616 F.2d at 657 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); note 82 supra.
93. See 616 F.2d at 646-47. For a discussion of the policy underlying sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5, see note 16 and accompanying text supra.
94. See 616 F.2d at 646-47. The state law seeks to regulate the daily con-
duct of corporations, whereas the federal law serves, inter alia, to provide
for full disclosure of material information. Id. See note 35 and accompany-
ing text supra.
95. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 15, § 4.7 (120), at 84.3.
96. See 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 16, § 6.05.
97. See 616 F.2d at 647. For a discussion of this aspect of materiality, see
note 71 and accompanying text supra.
98. This analysis, it is submitted, clearly comports with the materiality
requirement set forth in TSC and Santa Fe. For a discussion of materiality,
see notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
99. For a discussion of the TSC standard of materiality, see notes 38-41
-and accompanying text supra.
100. By contrast, Judge Aldisert stated in his dissent that he thought that
the majority suggested that a "different standard of materiality under federal
securities law applies when state remedies are available than when they are
not." 616 F.2d at 653 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). He also stated that Healey
"had no investment decision to make because his votes were unnecessary to
-complete the merger." Id. at 654 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). It is apparent,
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In the final analysis, Healey is perhaps most important as an
indicator that even the Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Fe has not
halted the lower federal courts from seeking to expand the application
of rule 1Ob-5.101 As the policy considerations set forth by the Supreme
Court in Santa Fe 102 await further development by the Court, the
limits of federal power under the federal securities laws remain un-
certain.'03 Thus, until the Supreme Court or the Congress provide
further guidance, 10 4 the effect of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 on cases
involving corporate mergers will remain subject to dispute.
Andrew J. Turezyn
however, that part of the "investment decision" to be made by a shareholder in
a merger situation is whether to contest the merger by seeking a state court
injunction. Thus, it is submitted that the majority properly applied the TSC
standard of materiality to the facts of a case involving a merger.
101. For a review of cases which have viewed Santa Fe as a mandate by
the Supreme Court to limit the rule 10b-5 remedy, see note 29 supra.
102. For a discussion of these considerations, see note 36 and accompany-
ing text supra.
103. The reach of rule lOb-5 and other federal securities laws remains
subject to dispute. For a review of recent Supreme Court decisions limiting
the reach of the federal securities laws, see note 80 supra.
104. The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code, which
contains an antifraud provision differing significantly from rule l0b-5 in a
number of ways, may soon be put before the Congress. Note, Codification of
Rule 10b-5 Private Actions in the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1615 (1979). For a view that lOb-5 should not be further codi-fied, see Lowenfels, Codification and Rule lOb-5, 23 VAND. L. REV. 591 (1970)
(arguing that the codifiers of lOb-5 are trying to limit its future force and
urging that it has performed its function well and should not be replaced).
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